India now has an official target date for moving away from encryption that quantum computers could break. A task force set up under the Department of Science and Technology (DST) and chaired by Dr Rajkumar Upadhyay, CEO of C-DOT, recommends that Critical Information Infrastructure (CII) such as defence, power and telecom fully adopt post-quantum cryptography (PQC) by 2029, and that other organisations do so by 2033.
The report, dated February 2026, is a set of recommendations rather than a law, but it signals what regulators, government buyers and large customers will start asking for. This guide explains the timeline, the main recommendations and what IT and security teams can do this year.
Why this is happening now
Most of today’s secure connections rely on public-key algorithms such as RSA and elliptic-curve cryptography (ECC). They protect internet banking sessions, VPNs, software updates, Aadhaar-linked e-signatures and the certificates behind every HTTPS website. A large, error-corrected quantum computer running Shor’s algorithm could break them. Nobody can say exactly when such a machine will exist, but migrating a large organisation’s cryptography usually takes many years.
The more immediate worry is “harvest now, decrypt later”. An attacker can copy encrypted traffic or backups today and keep them until decryption becomes possible. If your data has to stay confidential for ten years or more, it is already exposed to this risk. Examples include health records, defence and government files, long-term financial and tax data, source code, and trade secrets.
A simple test, often called Mosca’s rule, helps here: if (how long the data must stay secret) + (how long your migration will take) is longer than (the time until a capable quantum computer exists), you are already late. A bank that must keep loan records confidential for 10 years and needs 5 years to migrate is planning against a 15-year horizon.
The timeline at a glance
| Milestone | Critical Information Infrastructure (defence, power, telecom and others) | Other enterprises |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Build foundations: governance, cryptographic inventory, pilots | 2027 | 2028 |
| 2. Migrate high-priority systems | 2028 | 2030 |
| 3. Full PQC adoption | 2029 | 2033 |
The report’s testing framework adds more detail: migration of critical applications is planned between January 2027 and December 2029, and non-critical applications between January 2029 and December 2033. It names power, telecom, ISRO, DRDO and ONGC among the urgent adopters, and suggests early pilots in banking, finance and government.
What the task force recommends
1. Know where your cryptography is
Every organisation should build a cryptographic inventory: which algorithms, key sizes, libraries, certificates and protocols are used, and where. For purchases, the report proposes a phased Cryptographic Bill of Materials (CBOM), with vendors submitting CBOMs from FY 2027-28. A CBOM is to cryptography what an SBOM is to software components: a list you can audit.
2. Use standardised algorithms, often in hybrid mode
The report refers to the algorithms standardised by the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in August 2024: ML-KEM (FIPS 203, for key exchange and encryption) and ML-DSA (FIPS 204, for digital signatures). NIST also published SLH-DSA (FIPS 205) as a backup signature scheme. During the transition, many systems run a hybrid mode that combines a classical algorithm with a PQC one, so the connection stays safe if either is broken. The report says hybrid implementations must be tested for interoperability.
3. Build national testing and certification
The task force proposes a tiered lab system with assurance levels from basic conformance (L1) to critical infrastructure (L4). Labs must meet IS/ISO/IEC 17025 accreditation, for example through NABL. The target is to have Tier-1 and Tier-2 labs operating by December 2026. Proposed certificate validity runs from 3 years at L1 to 10 years at L4. Until the new framework is running, the existing TEC approval process continues.
| Assurance level | What it covers | Lab tier | Proposed validity |
|---|---|---|---|
| L1 | Basic conformance testing | Tier-1 | 3 years |
| L2A / L2B / L2C | Software / IT and IoT hardware / OT hardware | Tier-2 | 5 years |
| L3 | Enterprise | Tier-3 | 7 years |
| L4 | Critical infrastructure | Tier-3 | 10 years |
4. Bring regulators and buyers in
The report names sectoral regulators including RBI, SEBI, IRDAI, TRAI and CERC, and bodies such as TEC, STQC, BIS, CERT-In, MeitY and NCCS. It recommends common quantum-safe requirements in government RFPs, including crypto-agility and a compulsory bill of materials, and preferential consideration for indigenous quantum-safe products where they are technically suitable.
What this means for different organisations
- Banks, insurers and fintechs: expect questions from RBI, SEBI or IRDAI over the next few years. Long-lived customer data and signing keys for payments are the first items to review.
- Telecom, power and other CII operators: the 2027-2029 window is short. Hardware with a 10-15 year life, such as smart meters, SCADA gear and network equipment, needs PQC-ready procurement now.
- IT services firms and SaaS vendors: government and CII customers will ask for CBOMs and PQC roadmaps. Being able to answer quickly will matter in bids.
- Small and mid-sized companies: the 2033 target is far off, but most of your migration will come through vendor updates to browsers, operating systems, cloud services and VPNs. Your main job is to keep those up to date and avoid hard-coded cryptography in your own code.
A practical first-year plan for IT and security teams
- Appoint an owner. Make one person or team accountable for cryptography across the organisation, usually under the CISO.
- Run a discovery exercise. List TLS endpoints, VPNs, SSH, code-signing, PKI and certificate authorities, hardware security modules (HSMs), databases with encryption at rest, and third-party APIs. Automated scanners help, but you will also need application owners to answer questionnaires.
- Rank by data lifetime and exposure. Internet-facing systems carrying long-lived sensitive data go first.
- Ask vendors for roadmaps. Cloud providers, firewall and VPN vendors, HSM makers and PKI providers should tell you when they will support ML-KEM and ML-DSA, and whether they can provide a CBOM.
- Test hybrid key exchange. Recent versions of OpenSSL (3.5 onwards) and major web browsers already support hybrid ML-KEM key exchange in TLS 1.3. Try it in a test environment and check that load balancers and inspection proxies do not break larger handshakes.
- Build crypto-agility. Replace hard-coded algorithms with configuration, use maintained libraries, and shorten certificate lifetimes so you can swap algorithms without rewriting applications.
- Write it into contracts. Add PQC readiness and CBOM clauses to new procurement, especially for equipment you will run for a decade.
Common mistakes to avoid
- Waiting for the quantum computer. Harvest-now attacks mean the risk to long-lived data starts today.
- Writing your own PQC code. Use vetted libraries and validated modules, not home-grown implementations.
- Ignoring performance. PQC keys and signatures are larger than RSA or ECC ones. Test constrained devices, IoT links and high-volume APIs.
- Treating it as a one-off project. Standards will keep evolving. The goal is an organisation that can change algorithms quickly, not a single upgrade.
Career angle
Few people in India today combine PKI, applied cryptography and large-scale migration experience, and demand will grow as banks, telecom operators and government departments start their programmes. Security engineers, PKI administrators and solution architects can build a useful niche by learning how TLS, certificates and HSMs work in detail, then adding PQC. If you are planning a broader security path, see our cybersecurity certification roadmap. Teams handling personal data should also read our explainer on the DPDP Act and Rules, since data protection and encryption planning overlap.
FAQ
Is PQC adoption mandatory in India now?
Not yet. The task force report is a set of recommendations. Binding requirements would come through sectoral regulators, CERT-In directions or procurement rules. Treat the dates as the direction of travel.
Does symmetric encryption like AES also need replacing?
Generally not. The main threat is to public-key algorithms. AES with 256-bit keys is widely considered adequate; the bigger task is key exchange and digital signatures.
Will my website certificate need to change?
Eventually, yes, but the certificate ecosystem is still working on PQC signatures. Hybrid key exchange is the step most organisations can take first.
Last reviewed: 8 October 2026.
Sources
- DST: Report of the Task Force on Implementation of Quantum Safe Ecosystem in India (PDF, February 2026)
- DST: Quantum-Safe Ecosystem in India (PDF)
- NIST: First three finalised post-quantum encryption standards (August 2024)
- NIST IR 8547 (draft): Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards

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