Salespeople read their incentive plan more carefully than almost any other employee reads any policy. They work out exactly which deals pay, when, and how much, and then they behave accordingly. That makes a sales plan less a reward scheme than a steering mechanism. Each design lever pushes behaviour in a particular direction, and a plan that pays generously but steers badly can cost the company far more than it pays out.
Start with on-target earnings and pay mix
On-target earnings (OTE) is what a salesperson earns in a year if they hit exactly 100% of their target. Pay mix is the split of OTE between fixed salary and target incentive.
Take an enterprise account executive with OTE of ₹20 lakh and a 70:30 mix. Fixed pay is ₹14 lakh; target incentive is ₹6 lakh. The mix should reflect how much the individual actually influences the sale. A field hunter closing new logos largely through their own effort might be on 50:50 or 60:40. An account manager handling renewals that mostly happen anyway might be on 80:20. A presales consultant who influences deals but does not own them might be on 85:15 or 90:10. Too much variable pay for someone with little control over outcomes feels like a lottery; too little for a true hunter removes the reason to chase hard deals.
The payout curve
The plan then defines how incentive payout relates to quota attainment. Suppose this executive has an annual quota of ₹2 crore in new bookings and the curve has three parts:
- Threshold at 50%. Below half of quota, no incentive is paid.
- Linear from 50% to 100%. Each percentage point of attainment earns one point of payout.
- Accelerator above 100%. Each point above quota earns 1.5 points of payout.
| Attainment | Payout % of target incentive | Incentive (₹) |
|---|---|---|
| 45% | 0% | 0 |
| 50% | 50% | 3,00,000 |
| 80% | 80% | 4,80,000 |
| 100% | 100% | 6,00,000 |
| 130% | 145% | 8,70,000 |
| 160% | 190% | 11,40,000 |
The threshold stops the company paying for performance it would have got anyway. The accelerator makes the last deals of the year the most valuable, which is exactly when a salesperson is tempted to stop. Notice the cliff at the threshold: moving from 49% to 50% attainment is worth ₹3 lakh. Cliffs invite gaming, such as pulling a deal forward or holding one back to cross the line in the next period. Some plans soften this with a steeper ramp starting at a lower attainment instead of a jump.
Caps: protection or demotivation?
Sales leaders often argue for uncapped plans: if a rep sells five times quota, the company is delighted to pay. That is true when the extra sales reflect extra effort. It is less true when they reflect a windfall, such as a large customer placing a multi-year order that would have come regardless of who owned the account, or a quota that was set too low.
The risks of an uncapped plan are concrete: a single windfall can consume a large part of the sales compensation budget; payouts can exceed the margin on the business sold; and reps can be paid on bookings that later fall through. Common middle paths are a cap at a high multiple, often two or three times target incentive, a decelerated rate above a certain level, or a large-deal review clause that lets a committee adjust credit for exceptional orders. Whatever the approach, it should be written down in advance. Retrospectively capping a rep who has already earned the money destroys trust across the whole sales team.
Clawbacks and when credit is earned
The plan must define the moment an incentive is earned: on signed order, on invoice, on cash collection, or on go-live. Paying on signed order is fastest and most motivating, but if customers cancel, the company has paid commission on revenue it will never receive.
A clawback provision allows the company to recover or offset incentives paid on deals that are cancelled, refunded or not collected within a defined period. In practice, recovery is usually by deduction from future incentive payments, not demands for repayment of past salary. Under Indian wage law, deductions from wages are restricted to permitted categories, so clawbacks are generally structured as adjustments to future incentive calculations, and the plan document should spell out the mechanism. Clawbacks need a time limit as well; open-ended exposure to cancellations years later feels punitive and is hard to administer.
Measures that match the strategy
A plan that pays only on total bookings will get bookings, regardless of margin, product mix or customer quality. If the company wants new logos, gross margin, multi-year contracts or a strategic product line, those need explicit weight. Most well-designed plans use two or three measures, for example 70% on bookings and 30% on gross margin. Beyond three, salespeople struggle to see how their actions affect pay, and the plan stops steering.
Crediting rules matter just as much. When a deal involves an account executive, a presales consultant and an overlay specialist, who gets credit, and for how much? Double-crediting the same rupee to several roles is common and legitimate, but it must be budgeted for. Disputes over crediting are where much of the friction in sales compensation actually happens.
Testing before launch
Before a plan goes live, run last year’s actual deals through it. How many reps would have earned nothing? How many would have tripled their target? What would total payout have been as a percentage of revenue and margin? If a large share of the team would have missed threshold, quotas are probably unrealistic. If a handful of reps would have taken most of the money, check whether that reflects talent or territory. A plan that survives this test is far less likely to surprise anyone at year end.
Written by the RP Strativa Team. The plan design, quota and payout figures are illustrative.
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