Most security controls look for something malicious: a bad attachment, a dangerous link, a known exploit. Business email compromise, usually shortened to BEC, often contains none of these. The email is plain text. It asks a finance person to do something they do every week, such as pay an invoice or update a supplier’s bank details. The only malicious part is the intent behind it. That is why BEC consistently appears near the top of reported cybercrime losses. The FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center, for example, has ranked it among the costliest categories year after year, with reported losses in the billions of dollars.
The main patterns
BEC is a family of scams rather than a single technique. The common ones are:
- Executive impersonation. A message apparently from the CEO or CFO asks someone to make an urgent, confidential payment, or to buy gift cards for a “client event”. It usually arrives when the executive is known to be travelling.
- Vendor or invoice fraud. The attacker poses as a real supplier and says their bank account has changed. The next genuine invoice gets paid to the attacker.
- Thread hijacking. The attacker has access to a real mailbox, at the supplier or at the victim company, and replies inside an existing conversation about a real payment. This is the most convincing variant.
- Payroll diversion. An email “from an employee” asks HR to change the salary account before the payroll cut-off.
- Data theft. Instead of money, the request is for employee tax documents or customer lists, which feed later fraud.
How a compromised-mailbox BEC unfolds
The thread-hijacking version shows why BEC is hard to spot. Consider a sequence at an illustrative textile exporter in Tiruppur.
Week 1. An accounts assistant at the exporter’s European buyer enters her password on a fake document-sharing page. The attacker logs into her cloud mailbox from overseas. There is no MFA on that account.
Weeks 1 to 3. The attacker reads. They learn that a shipment payment of about €60,000 is due at month-end, who approves it and how the two companies write to each other. They create an inbox rule that moves any message containing words like “bank” or “payment” from the exporter into an obscure folder, so the real assistant does not see the conversation they are about to hijack.
Week 4. The attacker registers a domain one letter different from the exporter’s. From that domain, they email the buyer saying the exporter’s bank details have changed because of an “audit”, attaching a professional-looking letter. They also reply from the real compromised mailbox to keep the exporter reassured. Both sides believe they are talking to each other.
Week 5. The buyer pays the new account. The exporter chases the payment two weeks later. By then the money has moved through several accounts.
Note what was absent: no malware on any endpoint, no exploit, no attachment that a sandbox would flag. Email authentication would have passed for messages sent from the genuine mailbox, and the lookalike domain had its own valid records.
Where defenders actually catch it
Because the content looks normal, detection shifts to the account and the process.
Sign-in anomalies. The compromised mailbox logged in from a new country and a new device type. Identity logs from the email platform flag “impossible travel” or unfamiliar locations, if someone is watching.
Mailbox rule creation. New inbox rules that move, delete or forward messages based on finance keywords are one of the most reliable BEC signals. Legitimate users rarely build rules like that. Most cloud email platforms log rule changes; many SOCs alert on them directly.
Lookalike domains. Some email security tools flag messages from domains registered very recently or closely resembling known partners. Visual cues in the mail client, such as an “external sender” banner, help a little.
Process controls. This is where BEC is really stopped. A rule that any change to supplier or employee bank details must be confirmed by phone, using a number from the existing vendor master and never one from the email, defeats almost every variant. Dual approval for payments above a threshold, a cooling-off period before paying a newly changed account, and a habit of verifying unusual requests from executives through a second channel do the rest.
Why urgency is the tell
Almost every BEC message tries to compress the victim’s thinking time: “the auditor needs this today”, “I’m in a board meeting, don’t call”, “the old account is frozen”. Secrecy appears too, to stop the target from asking a colleague. Training that teaches staff to treat urgency plus secrecy plus a payment change as a combined red flag tends to work better than generic advice about suspicious emails, because it matches what the attack actually feels like on the receiving end.
When money has already moved
Speed matters more than anything. In India, victims of financial cyber fraud can report through the National Cyber Crime Reporting Portal (cybercrime.gov.in) or the 1930 helpline, and should contact their own bank immediately to request a recall or hold. Funds are far easier to freeze within the first hours than after they have been split across accounts. For international transfers, the remitting bank’s fraud team is the first call. Internally, the incident needs the usual response: reset the compromised credentials, remove malicious inbox rules, review what the attacker read, and check whether other partners received similar messages.
The lesson BEC teaches is uncomfortable but useful: some of the most damaging attacks are aimed at business processes, not at computers. The defences that work best are often a phone call and a second signature.
Written by the RP Strativa Team. The companies, amounts and timeline in the example are illustrative.
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