There are two broad ways to pay a chief executive. One is to give a large fixed salary with a modest bonus, so that the CEO’s income is predictable and the company’s risk of overpaying for bad results is small. The other is to give a smaller fixed pay and a large variable component, much of it in shares that vest over several years, so that the CEO’s wealth rises and falls with what shareholders experience. I will argue for the second, with conditions, and I will say where the first is the better choice. First, the machinery that decides all this in an Indian listed company.

Who actually decides

The Companies Act, 2013 (section 178) requires certain companies to constitute a Nomination and Remuneration Committee (NRC) of the board. For listed companies, SEBI’s listing regulations add specifics about composition, with independent directors forming a substantial part of the committee and an independent director chairing it. The exact numbers and the classes of company covered have been amended over time, so check the current text rather than a summary from years ago.

The committee’s job, broadly, is to recommend a remuneration policy for directors, key managerial personnel and senior management, to identify and recommend people for board and senior roles, and to lay down criteria for evaluating directors. In practice that means the NRC receives a proposal from HR (often with input from an external compensation consultant), tests it against peers and performance, and takes a recommendation to the board. Shareholders then see the outcome in the annual report, and for managerial remuneration above certain limits, they vote on it.

There is also a statutory ceiling. Section 197 of the Companies Act sets an overall limit on managerial remuneration as a percentage of net profits (11% in the base rule), with routes for exceeding it through shareholder approval and Schedule V conditions. The ceiling is a guardrail, not a design tool; nobody should build a pay philosophy by working backwards from it.

The case for mostly fixed pay

Fixed pay has real virtues. It is simple, cheap to administer and easy to explain to the press and to employees. It does not push a CEO into short-term gambles to hit a bonus trigger. In a business whose results depend heavily on forces nobody in the company controls (a commodity price, a regulated tariff), variable pay is mostly noise: the CEO gets rewarded for a lucky year and penalised for an unlucky one. In a family-controlled firm where the promoter is the CEO and already owns most of the equity, further share-linked pay adds little, because the promoter’s incentives are already aligned through ownership.

The problem is the other side of the same stability. Pay that does not move when performance moves sends a message too. If shareholders lose half their value over three years and the CEO’s compensation is unchanged, the committee has effectively promised that outcomes do not matter to it.

The case for performance-linked, long-vesting pay

Here the aim is alignment. Take an illustrative CEO of a mid-sized pharma company in Hyderabad. Suppose total target pay is ₹10 crore: ₹3 crore fixed, ₹2 crore annual bonus on budget metrics, and ₹5 crore as performance share units that vest after three years on relative shareholder return and return on capital employed. Only 30% is certain. For the CEO to see the other ₹7 crore, the business has to deliver this year and the next three.

This structure has three useful properties. It discourages borrowing from the future, since cutting R&D to inflate this year’s profit would hurt the three-year measures. It keeps the CEO from walking away rich after a bad stretch, since unvested units lapse. And it creates a natural retention hook without a special retention bonus.

I prefer it, but only when four conditions hold. The metrics must be few (two or three), measurable and hard to manipulate. The targets must be set against a credible plan, not lowered each year after a miss. There should be a clawback or malus provision for restatements and serious misconduct. And the disclosure must be good enough that a shareholder can see what was paid against which result. When any of these fail, long-term incentives drift into what the critics say they are: a lottery ticket the company hands out.

What the NRC should be asking

  • Is the pay mix consistent with the strategy we told investors about?
  • Which peers are we comparing with, and did we choose them because they are similar or because they pay more?
  • What does the payout look like in a bad year, a target year and an exceptional year? A scenario table prepared in advance is worth more than a verbal assurance.
  • What is the ratio between CEO pay and the median employee’s pay, and are we comfortable explaining it? Listed companies disclose this ratio, so someone will ask.
  • How does the senior team’s pay hang together beneath the CEO? A big gap just below the top can discourage the very people a successor will come from.

A word about the human side of the committee

The awkward truth is that the CEO usually knows the committee members, and the CHRO works for the CEO day to day while also advising the committee. That tension is real. Good practice is to let the committee hold some sessions without management present, to have the consultant report to the committee rather than to HR, and to record the reasoning for each decision. None of this removes the discomfort, but it gives independent directors a fair chance of doing what they were appointed to do.

Figures and names in the examples are illustrative.

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