Security awareness programmes tend to split into two camps. One camp runs frequent fake phishing emails, counts who clicks, and sends repeat offenders to remedial sessions or to their managers. The other treats awareness as a skill and a habit: short teaching, easy reporting, no naming and shaming. I will lay out both fairly and then say which I would choose, and why.

Approach one: test and measure

The appeal is obvious. Awareness is hard to measure, and a click rate is a number. The security team sends a simulated phishing email, perhaps a fake courier notice or a “revised appraisal letter”, to all staff. Afterwards it reports: 14 per cent clicked, 5 per cent entered credentials on the fake page. Leadership understands a percentage, and the compliance file gets evidence of training.

Done well, simulations also give people safe practice. Someone who is caught by a fake email and sees a short explanation immediately afterwards often remembers it better than from a slide deck. They also help you find which departments are exposed to which lures.

The weaknesses are worth stating plainly.

  • The metric is easily gamed and easily misread. A click rate swings with how convincing the lure was. A very easy test shows a low rate and false comfort; a cruel one, say a fake salary-revision mail, shows a high rate and resentment.
  • Punishment backfires. If clicking means a stern email to your manager, people learn to hide mistakes. And the mistake you most need to hear about is the real click on a real phish at 5 p.m. on a Friday. An employee who fears blame waits until Monday, or never reports.
  • Fake lures that exploit real emotions, such as bonus announcements or pay cuts, damage trust between staff and the security or HR team. That trust is something you will need later.
  • Clicking a link is not the same as being compromised. Modern attacks usually need several further steps, and a good technical setup should stop many of them.

Approach two: teach and make reporting easy

Here the headline metric flips. Instead of “how many people clicked”, you measure “how many people reported, and how fast”. A one-click report button in the mail client, a thank-you reply, and a visible follow-up (“that was a real phish, we blocked the sender, thanks to the three of you who reported it”) make staff feel part of the defence. Reports from staff are often the earliest warning a SOC gets that a campaign has slipped past filters.

Training in this model is short and specific. A five-minute session on a role-relevant risk (finance teams and vendor bank-detail changes; HR teams and unsolicited CVs with attachments; executives and impersonation) beats a yearly hour-long module that everyone clicks through. Teach what to do, not only what to fear: check the sender’s real address, hover before clicking, verify any payment change by calling a known number, and when unsure report instead of deleting.

The weakness here is evidence. It is harder to prove progress, and without any testing you cannot tell whether the training sticks. Some staff will never engage with voluntary material.

Where I land

Take the second approach as the foundation and keep simulations as a supporting instrument, not the headline. Concretely:

  1. Run simulations, but report results at team or department level, never as names on a list.
  2. Track report rate and time-to-report as the main figures. Watch the ratio of reporters to clickers over several quarters, not one result.
  3. Keep lures realistic but not cruel. Do not use real distress such as layoffs, medical issues or salary cuts.
  4. Give feedback within seconds of a click, with two or three practical tips.
  5. Reserve consequences for deliberate policy breaches, not for being fooled by a good fake.

My main reason is simple. Human attention fails sometimes, for everyone, including security professionals. A programme that assumes zero clicks will lose. A programme that assumes some clicks, and makes the next step (report, contain) fast, wins. Awareness also cannot carry the whole load. Email filtering, link rewriting, MFA that resists phishing, restricted admin rights and quick account lockouts are what limit the damage when someone does click.

Awareness extends beyond email, of course: voice calls pretending to be the bank or IT, QR codes on posters, messages on WhatsApp from a “director” asking for gift cards, USB drives found in a car park. A good programme names these too, and tells people one thing to do about each. Teach the habit of verifying through a second channel, and you cover a great many attacks with a single lesson.

Figures in the examples are illustrative.

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