Picture two software companies, Asha Cloud and Brindavan Systems, both based in Bengaluru. Both started the year with ₹80 crore of annual recurring revenue. Both finish it at ₹94 crore. In the board deck, each shows the same line: “ARR up 17.5%”. If that were all anyone looked at, you could not tell them apart.
Now look at where the ₹14 crore came from. This is what a revenue bridge, sometimes called a waterfall or ARR walk, is for. It starts with opening ARR, adds and subtracts the movements, and lands on closing ARR. Every rupee of change is assigned to one of four causes.
The four movements
New is recurring revenue from customers who did not exist at the start of the year. Expansion is extra revenue from existing customers: more seats, upgrades, more usage commitments. Contraction is existing customers paying less but staying, for example cutting seats at renewal. Churn is customers who left entirely, taking their whole contract with them.
Each company’s bridge, in ₹ crore:
| Asha Cloud | Brindavan Systems | |
|---|---|---|
| Opening ARR | 80 | 80 |
| New customers | 14 | 25 |
| Expansion | 9 | 4 |
| Contraction | -3 | -3 |
| Churn | -6 | -12 |
| Closing ARR | 94 | 94 |
Same start, same finish. Different companies.
What the two bridges say
Asha Cloud grew mostly from its installed base. If you take only the customers it had on day one, they ended the year paying ₹80 crore + 9 – 3 – 6 = ₹80 crore. Net revenue retention is therefore 100%. Existing customers, taken together, paid exactly as much as before, even though some left. All of the ₹14 crore growth came from new logos.
Brindavan sold more new business, ₹25 crore, which will have made the sales kickoff cheerful. But its base shrank: ₹80 crore + 4 – 3 – 12 = ₹69 crore, so net retention was 86.25%. Gross retention, which ignores expansion and counts only losses, was (80 – 3 – 12) / 80 = 81.25%, against 88.75% for Asha.
Next year, Brindavan starts the same way: it must sell ₹25 crore of new business just to replace what it expects to lose, and a good deal more to grow. It is running up an escalator going down. Asha, whose base is stable, gets every new rupee as growth.
Questions the bridge makes you ask
A bridge is not an answer, it is a prompt. For Brindavan, the large churn raises several: is it a few big accounts or many small ones? Did churned customers all join in the same quarter, perhaps from one discount-heavy campaign? Was it a particular segment, such as small businesses signed through a channel partner? Was the churn caused by a product failing, or by customers being acquired and consolidating vendors?
For Asha, the mirror questions apply. Is expansion broad, or did one customer add ₹5 crore? If one large account supplies more than half of the ₹9 crore, expansion looks healthy but is fragile. Is the new-customer number of ₹14 crore low because the pipeline is weak, or because the team spent the year on expansion?
Building one without fooling yourself
A few rules make a bridge trustworthy.
- Fix definitions first. Is a customer who stops paying for sixty days churned? Is a downgrade from an annual to a monthly plan contraction? Pick rules and write them down. Changing them mid-year makes a bridge useless.
- Classify at customer level, not deal level. A customer who cuts one product by ₹2 crore but buys another for ₹3 crore is one expansion of ₹1 crore, or two separate movements, depending on your policy. Decide, then stay consistent.
- Handle price rises on their own. If a 7% price increase accounts for half of Asha’s expansion, say so; it is a different kind of growth from customers buying more.
- Reconcile to finance. Closing ARR in the bridge must match the finance team’s ARR. If the CRM and the billing system disagree, find out why before presenting.
Currency also deserves a mention. A company with dollar contracts reporting in rupees will see ARR move simply because the exchange rate moved. Good bridges show a separate line for that effect, or are presented in constant currency.
Where the bridge runs out
A bridge tells you what happened, not why. It also treats a ₹1 crore customer and a ₹10 lakh customer as rupee-for-rupee equal, which hides concentration risk. And annual bridges arrive late; a quarterly or even monthly one catches the trouble while it can still be fixed.
Still, the exercise of splitting any growth number into its causes is useful far beyond SaaS. Whenever someone quotes a total, it is worth asking what went in and what went out.
Figures and names in the examples are illustrative.
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